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The existence of fixed points for single or multivalued mappings is obtained as a corollary
of Nash equilibrium existence in finitely many players games.
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1. Introduction
In game theory, the existence of equilibrium was uniformly obtained by the application
of a fixed point theorem. In fact, Nash [3, 4] shows the existence of equilibria for nonco-
operative static games as a direct consequence of Brouwer [1] or Kakutani [2] theorems.
More precisely, under some regularity conditions, given a game, there always exists a cor-
respondence whose fixed points coincide with the equilibrium points of the game.
However, it is natural to ask whether fixed points arguments are in fact necessary
tools to guarantee the Nash equilibrium existence. (In this direction, Zhao [5] shows
the equivalence between Nash equilibrium existence theorem and Kakutani (or Brouwer)
fixed point theorem in an indirect way. However, as he points out, a constructive proof is
preferable. In fact, any pair of logical sentences A and B that are true will be equivalent
(in an indirect way). For instance, to show that A implies B it is suﬃcient to repeat the
proof of B.) For this reason, we study conditions to assure that fixed points of a continu-
ous function, or of a closed-graph correspondence, can be attained as Nash equilibria of
a noncooperative game.
2. Definitions
Let Y ⊂ Rn be a convex set. A function v : Y → R is quasiconcave if, for each λ ∈ (0,1),
we have v(λy1 + (1− λ)y2)≥min{v(y1),v(y2)}, for all (y1, y2)∈ Y ×Y . Moreover, if for
each pair (y1, y2)∈ Y ×Y such that y1 = y2 the inequality above is strict, independently
of the value of λ∈ (0,1), we say that v is strictly quasiconcave.
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2 Fixed points as Nash equilibria
A mapping f : X ⊂ Rm → X has a fixed point if there is x ∈ X such that f (x) = x. A
vector x ∈ X is a fixed point of a correspondence Φ : X  X if x ∈Φ(x).
Given a game  = {I ,Si,vi}, in which each player i ∈ I = {1,2, . . . ,n} is characterized
by a set of strategies Si ⊂Rni , and by an objective function vi :
∏n
j=1 Sj →R, a Nash equi-
librium is a vector s= (s1,s2, . . . ,sn)∈Πni=1Si, such that vi(s)≥ vi(si,s−i), for all si ∈ Si, for
all i∈ I , where s−i = (s1, . . . ,si−1,si+1, . . . ,sn).
Finally, let = {S : ∃n∈N, S⊂Rn is nonempty, convex, and compact}.
3. Main Results
Consider the following statements.
[Nash-1]. Given  = {I ,Si,vi}, suppose that each set Si ∈ and that objective functions
are continuous in its domains and strictly quasiconcave in its own strategy. Then there is
a Nash equilibrium for .
[Nash-2]. Given  = {I ,Si,vi}, suppose that each set Si ∈ and that objective functions
are continuous in its domains and quasiconcave in its own strategy. Then there is a Nash
equilibrium for .
[Brouwer]. Given X ∈, every continuous function f : X → X has a fixed point.
[Kakutani∗]. Given X ∈, every closed-graph correspondenceΦ : X  X , withΦ(x)∈
 for all x ∈ X , has a fixed point, provided that Φ(x)=∏mj=1πmj (Φ(x)) for each x ∈ X ⊂
Rm. (For each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, the projections πmj : Rm → R are defined by πmj (x) = xj ,




j (Φ(x)), is not necessary
to assure the existence of a fixed point, provided that the other assumptions hold. How-
ever, when objective functions are quasiconcave, [Kakutani∗] is suﬃcient to assure the
existence of a Nash equilibrium.)
Our results are [Nash-1]→ [Brouwer].
Proof. Given a nonempty, convex, and compact set X ⊂ Rm and a continuous function
f : X → X , consider a game  with two players I = {A,B}, which are characterized by the
sets of strategies SA = SB = X and by the objective functions: vA(xA,xB) = −‖xA − xB‖2
and vB(xA,xB)=−‖ f (xA)− xB‖2, where ‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean norm in Rm.
As objective functions are continuous in SA × SB and strictly quasiconcave in own
strategy, there exists a Nash equilibrium (xA,xB). Moreover, xA = xB and xB = f (xA),
that assure the existence of a fixed point of f : X → X .
In fact, if xA = xB, then vA(xA,xB) < 0. Thus, player A can improve his gains choosing
a response xA = xB ∈ X , as vA(xB,xB) = 0, a contradiction. Analogous arguments prove
that xB = f (xA) because f (xA)∈ X .
We have [Nash-2]→ [Kakutani∗]. 
Proof. Fix a set X ⊂ and a correspondence Φ : X  X that satisfies the assumptions
of [Kakutani∗]. Define, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, the functions κmi : Rm ×Rm → Rm ×R by
κmi (x, y)= (x, yi), where y = (y1, . . . , ym)∈Rm.
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Consider a game  withm+1 players, {0,1, . . . ,m}, characterized by the sets of strate-
gies (S0, (Si; i > 0)) := (X , (πmi (X); i > 0)) and by the objective functions: v0(x0,x−0) =
−‖x0 − x−0‖2, vi(x0,x1, . . . ,xm) = −min(r,si)∈κmi (Gr[Φ])‖(x0,xi)− (r,si)‖max, where Gr[Φ]
denotes the graph of Φ, ‖ · ‖max is the max-norm, and x−0 := (x1, . . . ,xm).
As hypotheses of [Nash-2] hold (see the appendix), there is an equilibrium (x0;
(x1, . . . ,xm)) for . It follows that xi ∈ πmi (Φ(x0))(If xi /∈ πmi (Φ(x0)) then, by defini-
tion, (x0,xi) /∈ κmi (Gr[Φ]). Thus, player i’s utility, vi(x0,x1, . . . ,xm) < 0. However, choos-
ing any xi ∈ πmi (Φ(x0)) = ∅, the player i can improve his gains, as (x0,xi) ∈ κmi (Gr[Φ])
and, therefore, his utility will be equal to zero, a contradiction.) Therefore, by Assump-
tion [Kakutani∗], (x1, . . . ,xm) ∈ Φ(x0). Finally, x0 = (x1, . . . ,xm) ∈ Φ(x0)(If x0 = x−0 :=
(x1, . . . ,xn), we have that v0(x0,x−0) :=−‖x0− x−0‖2 < 0. Thus, player 0 can improve his
position choosing x0 = x−0 ∈ X .) That concludes the proof. 
Appendix
It follows from definitions above that the sets of strategies satisfy the assumptions of
[Nash-2], objective functions are continuous and v0 is quasiconcave in it own strategy.
Thus, rest to assure that functions vi, with i ≥ 1, are quasiconcave in its own strategy.
This will be a direct consequence of the following lemma, taking Z = κmi (Gr[Φ]).
Given x ∈ Rm+1 and a nonempty set Z ⊂ Rm+1, the distance from x to Z is d(x,Z) =
inf z∈Z ‖x− z‖max. Note that the function x → d(x,Z) is continuous, because |d(x1,Z)−
d(x2,Z)| ≤ ‖x1− x2‖max. For convenience of notations, let π : Rm×R→ Rm be the pro-
jection defined by π(x, y)= x.
Lemma A.1. Suppose that Z ⊂ Rm+1 is a nonempty and compact set such that, for each
x ∈ Rm, both π(Z) and Z ∩ π−1(x) are convex sets. Then the function f : Rm ×R→ R
defined by f (x, t)= d((x, t),Z) is quasiconvex in t.
Proof. Fix a vector x0 ∈ Rm. We have to show that Lc = {t ∈ R; d((x0, t),Z) ≤ c} is a
convex set for every c ≥ 0. Assume by contradiction that, given c ≥ 0, there are scalars
t1 < t∗ < t2 such that t1,t2 ∈ Lc and t∗ ∈ Lc. Let A := {x ∈ π(Z); ‖x− x0‖max ≤ c} and
consider the following sets:
A1 = {x ∈A; ∃t ∈R s.t. (x, t)∈ Z, t ≤ t∗ − c};
A2 = {x ∈A; ∃t ∈R s.t. (x, t)∈ Z, t ≥ t∗ + c}.
(A.1)
Since d((x0, t∗),Z) > c, we have A = A1 ∪A2. Moreover, A1 ∩A2 =∅. (If there exists a
vector x ∈A1∩A2, then ‖x− x0‖max ≤ c and, by the convexity of Z∩π−1(x), (x, t∗)∈ Z,
contradicting d((x0, t∗),Z) > c.) Since Z is compact, A1 and A2 are compact as well. And
since π(Z) is convex, so is A. In particular, A is connected. Therefore, A1 =∅ or A2 =∅.
On the other hand, d((x0, t1),Z) ≤ c, so there exists a point (x′, t′) ∈ Z c-close to
(x0, t1). Then ‖x′ − x0‖max ≤ c and t′ ≤ t1 + c < t∗ + c, therefore x′ ∈ A \A2, proving that
A1 = ∅. Analogously, it follows from d((x0, t2),Z) ≤ c that A2 = ∅. We have obtained a
contradiction. 
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